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Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc.,
879 F. SuPP. 1200 (N.D. GA. 1995).
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Jeff Foxworthy ("Foxworthy"), a comedian, commenced an
infringement action against the defendant, Custom Tees, Inc. ("Custom Tees"),
claiming the defendant violated the copyright in his currently popular "You
might be a redneck if... " jokes' by printing and marketing t-shirts with
slogans similar to Foxworthy's redneck jokes. In its opinion, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted Foxworthy's motion
for a preliminary injunction holding in pertinent part2 that: (1) the phrase "you
might be a redneck" was entitled to trademark protection; (2) the comedian's
jokes were entitled to copyright protection; (3) the comedian successfully estab-
lished a likelihood of confusion necessary for preliminary injunctive relief; and
(4) the balance of hardships favored the comedian.
FACTS
Comedian Jeff Foxworthy is known throughout the country for his "you
might be a redneck if... "jokes. His album, You Might be a Redneck If....
has sold more copies than any other comedy record in more than a decade.
Foxworthy claims copyright ownership to hundreds of these one-liner jokes as
well as a common-law trademark in the phrase "you might be a redneck
if .... ." In addition to his live performances and the comedy album,
Foxworthy has marketed a calendar with one such joke for every day of the
year, and he sells t-shirts with his redneck jokes on them at his concerts and
elsewhere.
In December 1994, Foxworthy became aware that t-shirts bearing the "you
might be a redneck if... "jokes were being sold in stores across the country.
The only difference between Foxworthy's jokes and those on the t-shirts was
the format. On these shirts the phrase " ... you might be a redneck" followed
the punch line rather than precede it as in Foxworthy's jokes. The source of
these t-shirts was determined by Foxworthy and his associates to be the defen-
1. Examples of the punch lines to these jokes, as given in the text of the opinion include: "you
might be a redneck... you've ever fimanced a tattoo... [and] you might be a redneck if... your
dad walks you to school because you're in the same grade." Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F.
Supp. 1200, 1204 (N.D. Ga 1995).
2. In order to concentrate on the aspects of this case most relevant to art and entertainment law,
the court's consideration of venue, forum and personal jurisdiction is omitted from this case summa-
ry. These jurisdictional issues were adjudicated based on well-established principles of law unrelated
to the copyright issues.
3. The court uses the term "trademark" throughout its analysis for convenience, though
Foxworthy also claims a service mark in connection with his entertainment services.
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dant, Custom Tees, Inc. Custom Tees admitted producing and marketing the t-
shirts. Once notified that the jokes on the tee shirts violated Foxworthy's copy-
right and/or trademark, Custom Tees sought legal counsel. Subsequently, Cus-
tom Tees modified the copy on its shirts to read " ... you ain't nothin' but a
redneck" following the punch line. Prior to trial, Foxworthy sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent further manufacturing and distribution of the shirts.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
As this was a ruling on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, the
court first set out the requirements for success on the motion. In doing so the
court titles many of the sections and subsections of its opinion in a form which
mimics the style of the redneck jokes about which the plaintiff has filed suit.
For example, within its analysis, the court uses headings such as: "Plaintiff
Might be Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction If ... " "Plaintiff Might be
Likely to Succeed on the Merits If... " and "The Public's Interest Might be
Served If .... " Along those lines, the court stated that in order to be entitled to
a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that
he will succeed on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury unless
the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4)
that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest. 4 Hav-
ing set out the criteria, the court duly examined each of the specified factors,
though clearly the factor related to the likelihood of the movant's success merit-
ed the vast majority of the court's attention. Because Foxworthy's jokes are
composed of a combination of copyright and common-law trademark compo-
nents, the court divided its "likelihood for success" analysis into separate copy-
right and trademark sections.
The court began its trademark analysis by noting that unregistered, common-
law trademarks are protected from infringement by unauthorized use where that
use is likely to cause confusion among the consuming public as to the source of
the goods or services at issue.' In order to prove a violation of the Lanham
Act, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has trademark rights in the mark or
name at issue; and (2) that the defendant adopted a mark or name that is the
same, or confusingly similar, to the plaintiff's mark, such that there is a likeli-
hood of confusion for consumers as to the proper origin of the goods in ques-
tion.6
Under this two-part formula, the first inquiry for the court was whether
Foxworthy in fact had a trademark to protect. The court answered this question
in the affirmative based in part on its conclusion that the phrase "you might be
a redneck" is commonly associated with the plaintiff. Such association of the
phrase to the plaintiff is a result of Foxworthy's extensive marketing of a calen-
4. Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985).
5. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1993).
6. Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984).
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dar and book using the phrase in their titles and his consistent use of the phrase
as the title for most of his concert tours, television specials and videocassettes.
The court's conclusion was also based on its determination that although the
phrase arguably served a functional role as the vehicle for delivery of
Foxworthy's various punch lines, the functional aspect of the phrase did not
defeat its ability to be protected since it also played a clear role in identifying
and distinguishing Foxworthy's brand of redneck humor from other uses of the
same subject matter.7
The second prong of the court's Lanham Act analysis was whether the
defendant's t-shirts were likely to cause confusion among the consuming public
with respect to the products' source and their connection to Foxworthy.' This
factor was described by the court as the essence of traditional Lanham Act
analysis. Since Custom Tees had modified its t-shirts to use the "When...
you ain't nothin' but a redneck" wording upon notification of Foxworthy's suit,
the question before the court therefore was whether this phrase was likely to
confuse the public as to whether Foxworthy was the source of the shirts. The
court resolved this issue by employing a list of seven specific factors articulated
by the Eleventh Circuit in Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton.9 The court addressed
each of the factors in turn, concluding that each factor favored the plaintiff,
some more strongly than others. None of the factors were determined to favor
the defendant, and the court therefore concluded that the defendant's t-shirts
would cause confusion among the consuming public.
Having shown a violation of the Lanham Act, the court then examined the
copyright aspects of the case with respect to the plaintiff's prospects for success
on the merits. This inquiry consisted of two main themes: (1) whether
Foxworthy was the owner of a valid copyright; and (2) whether the copyrighted
works were unlawfully copied by the defendant. The second determination
would, according to the court, require a showing that the defendant had access
to the copyrighted work and that the defendant's work is substantially similar to
that of the plaintiff.'"
The court found that Foxworthy did have a valid copyright in his jokes, and
furthermore, that the fact that Foxworthy had received some portion of his ideas
for the redneck jokes from other people was irrelevant since Foxworthy testified
that it was he who put all of the ideas, regardless of their source, into the recog-
7. See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir.
1979).
8. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th
Cir. 1977).
9. The factors to be considered were: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the similarity
between the plaintiff's mark and the allegedly infringing one; (3) the similarity between the products
and services offered by the plaintiff and the defendant; (4) the similarity of the sales methods em-
ployed by each party; (5) the similarity of the advertising methods; (6) the intent of the defendant,
i.e., whether the defendant was hoping to gain a competitive advantage by associating its product
with the plaintiff's mark; and most persuasively, (7) whether there was actual confusion. Conagra,
743 F.2d at 1514.
10. Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1275 (1lth Cir. 1992).
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nizable format at issue in this case. The court stressed the fundamental basis of
copyright law - that it was Foxworthy's particular expression, not the ideas or
subject matter, which were deserving of protection." Because Custom Tees
had, according to the court, clearly copied the plaintiff's jokes verbatim, there
was no need for a detailed examination of substantial similarity.
Following the substantive analyses, the court concluded its opinion by ad-
dressing the three other determinative factors relevant to issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction. As to the question of irreparable injury to the plaintiff were the
injunction not issued, the court noted that once a prima facie showing of either
trademark or copyright infringement is made by a plaintiff, irreparable harm is
ordinarily presumed. 2 Regarding the factual inquiry into the balance of hard-
ships required in preliminary injunction analysis, the court held that Foxworthy
would suffer the greater burden. 3 The court answered affirmatively that the
public interest would be served by issuing an injunction in the instant matter.
The court held such interest in protecting valid trademarks was achieved by
preventing confusion among consumers. Having found that all four factors in
the preliminary injunction analysis favored the movant, Foxworthy, the motion
was accordingly granted.
CONCLUSION
Foxworthy sued the manufacturer of t-shirts imprinted with "you might be a
redneck if... " jokes for infringement of his copyright and trademark. On
Foxworthy's motion for preliminary injunction, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, holding that there was a likelihood of success on the merits. The
court's conclusion rested, in part, on the grounds that Foxworthy had established
a protectable trademark in the phrase "you might be a redneck if... " and that
the defendant's t-shirts would cause confusion among the consuming public as
to the source of the products or their association with the plaintiff. The court's
conclusion was also based on a finding that Foxworthy held a valid copyright in
the redneck jokes and that Custom Tees had directly copied those jokes without
permission from Foxworthy.
Christopher Finberg
11. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
12. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1040
(N.D. Ga. 1986).
13. At a minimum, Foxworthy would be forced to compete with an infringer until the matter
could be adjudicated, whereas Custom Tees would only be prevented from selling infringing products
were the injunction issued.
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